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SMALL NAVIES AND NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Is There a Role?
Paul T. Mitchell
Is there a place for small navies in network-centric warfare? Will they be able tomake any sort of contribution in multinational naval operations of the future? Or
will they be relegated to the sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, en-
couraged to stay out of the way—or stay at home? If the recent experience of the
Canadian navy is any guide, small navies have every right to be concerned about
their future in network-centric operations. For while the Canadian navy has
achieved a high degree of success within U.S. naval formations, it has done so only
by virtue of highly privileged access. To date, the challenges posed by the revolu-
tion in military affairs in general and network-centric warfare (NCW) in specific
have been framed in terms of technology and investment.1 The allies and partners
of the United States are lagging in technology and
investment therein, and they need to make significant
capital investments in order to catch up. Worse,
“dynamic coalitions,” developed rapidly to deal with
crisis situations, may become the most common
form of military cooperation. In such coalitions, de-
tailed, prearranged plans and doctrine are likely to be
entirely absent. Partners will have had little in-depth
operational experience or knowledge of their own
capabilities. Technical standardization will be low;
national logistical support may be limited or entirely
absent. Significantly, there may be serious questions
regarding the professionalism of personnel partici-
pating in these coalitions.2
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How dynamic coalitions will function in network-centric warfare is un-
doubtedly problematic. One commentator has recently suggested that the na-
ture of NCW may ultimately result in more unilateral (or virtually unilateral)
U.S. operations, such as that recently conducted in Afghanistan. In effect, the
risk of “clueless coalitions” may drive the United States, however unwillingly, to-
ward a more unilateralist military policy, irrespective of that enunciated in its
national security strategy.3 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have called for a more “tai-
lored approach to interoperability that accommodates a wide range of needs
and capabilities” without implying “access without restraint.”4 In the unstruc-
tured environment implied by the concept of dynamic coalitions, however, the
policy restraints upon information sharing, surely the heart of network-centric
warfare, may be considerable. As Thomas Barnett has pointed out, “Not only
will our allies have little to contribute to the come-as-you-are party, they won’t
be able to track the course of the conversation.”5
This article examines the nature of NCW, the challenges it presents to coali-
tion operations, and some recent developments that seek to overcome these
challenges. It uses the Canadian navy’s recent and ongoing experience of directly
integrating into U.S. carrier battle group operations as a test case. The article
finds that the principal challenges that will be raised by NCW are not likely to be
technical ones, although undoubtedly these will be formidable. Rather, the most
challenging issues for all navies, and small ones in particular, stem from policy. If
Canada’s example is typical, navies that have less well developed relationships
with the U.S. Navy are likely to confront such crippling difficulties in integrating
into NCW-dominated operations as to be excluded from them.
THE NATURE OF NCW
Much of what has been revolutionary in the revolution in military affairs is not
so revolutionary from a naval perspective.6 Navies have been working with in-
formation technology since 1957, when the CANUKUS Naval Data Transmis-
sion Working Group, after three years of deliberations, ratified the technical
standard for data exchange.7
Link 11 is more or less standard among Western navies. Primarily used to
share tactical information so as to develop what is now known as a “common
operational picture” within a task group, Link 11 data is also used by the U.S.
Navy to transmit certain engagement orders. However, for many reasons, Link
11 is relatively slow. Because of significant lag times between target detection
and the posting of data onto the Link network, its information is not of fire-control
quality. Further, it passes to linked ships only the data that has already been pro-
cessed on board the contributing ship. This occasionally leads to duplicate
tracks or conflicting information about the same target. Link 11 demands a high
8 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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degree of professional competence on the part of track coordinators in order to
keep the operating picture “clean.”8
Network-centric warfare aims at increasing the efficiency of the transfer of
maritime information among participating units (or nodes). By optimizing the
efficiency of operations through information exchange, even small naval forma-
tions can generate additional combat power.9 Data is manipulated by a series of
dynamic and interlinked “grids”: sensor grids gather the data, information grids
fuse and process it, and engagement grids manage the operations generated.10
Improved operational efficiency results not only from the increased speed at
which operations can proceed but also from the “self-synchronization” that is
generated between units.11 This speed and synchronization ultimately merge the
strategic “recognized maritime picture” with common operational and tactical
pictures.12 For example, in Canadian ships, the recognized maritime picture is
provided to ships by shore-based facilities, whereas ship-based sensors and tac-
tical data links generate local information. At the moment, neither informs the
other, which can often lead to discrepancies. With the merging of information
into a common pool distributed by linked systems, plans and operations will be-
come much more dynamic. They will be able to react instantly to changes in the
battle space, by virtue of their enhanced awareness of them. For navies having
this capability, the result is a competitive advantage, an ability to “lock in suc-
cess” while locking out enemy initiative.13
The original requirement to increase reaction speeds arose in the Cold War in
order to deal with hypothesized regiment-sized air attacks on surface ships; the
present impetus for speed and synchronization is the return of fleet operations
to their traditional setting, in and around the littorals. The sheer density of mar-
itime and air traffic, the presence of naval, commercial, and recreational mari-
time vehicles, results in a level of complexity that blue-water operations rarely
encounter. This web of activity is made all the worse by the influence of micro-
climates, complex oceanography, and unique geographical features. Finally, in
the littoral, there are few places where a warship does not stand out, whereas
defenders are afforded a multitude of opportunities to hide their forces,
whether geographically or through deception, basing them on nonnaval plat-
forms.14 In effect, naval forces are forced onto an “asymmetrical” battlefield in
the littorals.15
In response, networked operations permit enhanced speed and synchroniza-
tion, which generate predictive planning and preemption, resulting in proactive,
“maneuverist,”effects-based operations; integrated force management, allowing
synchronization of missions and resources; and execution of time-critical mis-
sions, employing “near optimal weapons pairings.”16
M I T C H E L L 8 5
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The most explicit technological development stemming from these concep-
tual underpinnings has been “cooperative engagement,” which passed its opera-
tional evaluation trials in September 2001.17 Cooperative engagement, like Link
11, seeks to develop the common operational picture; unlike Link 11, however, it
also aims to coordinate threat decisions in real time. Further, it also attempts to
distribute fire-control-quality information to participating network nodes.18
Cooperative engagement improves a force’s ability to share data, even that of a
fragmentary nature. For example, because of stealth technology or terrain-
masking effects, a ship’s sensors may be unable to collect precise and complete
information on a particular target. In a formation equipped with cooperative
engagement, ships would auto-
matically cue other sensors within
the formation, producing a more
detailed picture. All this informa-
tion could then be pooled with
the data collected by other more
distant ships to assemble a “composite picture” of the target that no single ship
would have been able to generate. Units might thereby receive fire-control-quality
information on targets outside their sensor horizons; they could fire weapons
before threats appeared to them, allowing engagements to take place at maxi-
mum distance from the targets.19 The end result of all this would be a consider-
able increase in the time available to make decisions—more time to assess
threats and respond—and operations faster than the opponent can sense and re-
spond to himself. Cooperative engagement is not the only technical develop-
ment speeding up the pace and efficiency of naval operations within the U.S.
Navy. Much like the private business world in the last five years, the U.S. military
has taken advantage of the Internet to improve the flow of information. The
Defense Message System, backed up by the Secret Internet Protocol Routing
Network (SIPRNET), has introduced a series of World Wide Web–based ap-
plications such as e-mail with attachments, “chat rooms,” and web pages.20
SIPRNET in particular seems to have had a revolutionary impact on the plan-
ning and conduct of operations within the U.S. military. It has transformed la-
borious manual procedures into rapid electronic ones. This became most
evident during Operation ALLIED FORCE, when the sheer amount of paperwork
forced planners to use electronic formats, “which were substantially easier to
create, pass via e-mail, and maintain visibility on.” As superiors appended
their comments on forwarded messages, it became simpler to track the evo-
lution of commanders’ intentions as well.21 Even “chat rooms,” so ubiquitous
among idle teenagers, have a distinctly revolutionary aspect in that they per-
mit the transmission of information (along with attachments of imagery and
8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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other intelligence) without radio communication, thus preserving communica-
tions security within a theater.22
Video teleconferencing (VTC) has also led to “compressed command and
control processes” through its ability to span the strategic, operational, and tac-
tical levels. It is particularly useful for staffs that are widely dispersed geographi-
cally.23 A previous Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Dan Murphy, called
VTC “the wave of the future.” Video teleconferencing obviates the need to collo-
cate staffs and reduces ambiguity in commanders’ intentions.24 VTC and chat
functions collectively permit “distributed collaborative planning,” which
seeks to assemble problem solvers for rapid and effective response to time-
critical situations, while providing access to and ensuring the availability of in-
formation resources.25 Aircraft carrier battle groups are inherently dynamic
given the constant flow through them of ships, personnel, and new technology.
It is necessary to control this dynamism rather than be overwhelmed by it; ac-
cordingly, a battlegroup deployment involves a meticulous process of training
and planning through which all participating units and individuals become fa-
miliar with the synergies between processes, procedures, and systems. The prod-
uct is a specified “battle rhythm” (see figure 1). This battle rhythm requires that
everything within the group, system, individual, or ship, “not have an adverse ef-
fect on communications or information flow.” To this end, the battle group pro-
ceeds through a series of subunit and unit training exercises. These culminate in
the “comprehensive task unit exercise” that certifies the battle group for basic
functions and a final “joint task force exercise” that combines the CVBG with
other formations, such as amphibious groups and allied formations.26
ALLIED FORCE and subsequent operations in Kosovo are widely hailed as be-
ginning the introduction of network-centric operations, and ENDURING FREE-
DOM in Afghanistan has laid to rest many of the criticisms. This is especially so
since that operation saw the confrontation of a high-tech military against a rag-
tag, guerrilla-type army:
M I T C H E L L 8 7
Time Event
05:00 Receive unit operational reports
08:00 Brief battle group commander
09:00 Brief JTF commander
10:00 Warfare commanders’ coordination board
13:00 Planning cell meetings
18:00 Release commander’s intentions and situation report messages
20:00 Units receive commander’s intentions
00:00 Units release operational reports
FIGURE 1
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The Afghanistan operation may ultimately prove to be a boon to the Department of
Defense’s revolution in military affairs, in which the prize is not territory but infor-
mation. Only after a clear picture of the battlefield is assured—and that shared with
as many weapons platforms as possible—can the maximum potential of PGMs and
other high tech weaponry be unleashed both militarily and politically.
Particularly impressive has been the manner in which information from a
wide variety of sources has been processed and fused for both air and ground
forces, thus permitting midcourse updates, engagement zones, “moving target
options,” and cockpit target imagery.27
Equally evident, however, was the initial lack of allied participation in the
most secret and demanding operations. While this might have stemmed from a
general lack of allied logistical lift, other possibilities must also be considered. As
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, the “godfather” of network-centric warfare,
has noted, while the United States wants its partners to be as interoperable as
possible, “not being interoperable means that you are not on the net; so you are
not in a position to derive power from the information age.”28
NCW AND INFORMATION BARRIERS
Getting on the net may not be a simple process at all for allies and coalition part-
ners. Essentially, these nations face two distinct challenges: network access may
be hampered by technical incompatibilities inherent in their force structures,
but it may be obstructed also by design.29
Recent operations in the Balkans have underscored the difficulties of meeting
American expectations for rapid, information-dense operations. During opera-
tion SHARP GUARD, conducted by NATO and the Western European Union in the
mid-1990s, the ability of a ship to compile an operational picture was limited at
times to its own horizon. Further, the commander of NATO Naval Forces South,
in Naples, initially had no timely access to information being collected by units
under his command.30 During ALLIED FORCE, “existing data networks were not
adequate to support the flow of information of . . . data among key nodes of the
NATO information grid.” Further, the United States was unable to pass along
“high-fidelity data”; the alliance experienced accordingly difficulties attacking
time-sensitive targets, “because of the need for rapid exchange of precision tar-
geting data and continuous precision updates from sensor to shooter until the
target is destroyed.”31
Although some of these issues later found technical solutions (SHARP GUARD
units and command centers eventually received old U.S. Navy Joint Operational
Tactical System terminals, for example), the “need for speed” in network-centric
operations places the whole notion of multinational operations at risk.
Interoperability barriers may exclude even close allies. Connectivity problems
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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are the “equivalent of changing to a different railway gauge at each national bor-
der”;32 high-tempo operations therefore ultimately become hostages to the units
with the slowest information and decision cycles.33 Just as pressing and in the
long term even more damaging than technology differentials may be lack of
physical access. Liaison officers have traditionally been exchanged by militaries
to ensure the transmission of information among partners, particularly when
there are interoperability problems.34 Today, liaison officers are often unable to
enter U.S. command centers because of security restrictions.35 Technology itself
may ultimately lead to the electronic equivalents of these physical barriers.
The growing use of video teleconferencing directly raises this issue, because
of the classified information frequently involved. In order to access a VTC link,
“all users must be on the same level of classification of network and have access
to the information on the network.”36 The lack of timely written documentation
and the instantaneous, experien-
tial nature of VTC hinder any
participation by those not on the
network.37 As Major General John
Kiszely of the British army has
pointed out more broadly, “Full interoperability between forces would depend
upon integrated collaborative planning based on the maintenance of a common
operating picture and common intelligence inputs. Without appropriate digital
communications, this would not be practical, and made all the more unlikely
because the U.S. SIPRNET is NOFORN [not releasable to foreign nationals].”38
Thus, network-centric operations in a coalition or alliance environment may
ultimately hinge on information releasability rules and the ability to exchange
information between networks of different security classifications.
The underlying trouble is that the guiding principle of NCW is to increase the
speed and efficiency of operations, whereas coalitions are rarely concerned
about combat efficiency. Coalitions are always about scarcity—in terms of oper-
ational resources, political legitimacy, or both. The trade-off is always in terms
of political influence over operational considerations; in coalitions, politics fre-
quently trump efficiency. Neither is information releasability policy oriented
around efficiency, but rather security. “Information release and control must be
conducted in a manner that prevents damaging foreign disclosure[;] this capa-
bility must be demonstrated to information owners” before any transfer can be
effected.39 Information, and what it may imply about the systems that collected
it, may be too sensitive to be entrusted to others.
In the absence of clearinghouses for information, information disclosure be-
tween nations is typically a tedious and cumbersome procedure.40 Further, be-
cause the long-term effect of individual disclosures can be difficult to ascertain
M I T C H E L L 8 9
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and because the career impact of improper disclosure is so serious, “command-
ers often choose stringent release rules to avoid problems.”41 In this way,
releasability concerns have dictated separated networks operating at different
tempos. As Brigadier General Gary Salisbury, director of command, control, and
communications systems for U.S. European Command, characterized the situa-
tion in September 2001,
How do [combined planners] get these national communication and information
needs and fit these into a coalition environment? The bottom line is we are generally
operating two different networks at two different security levels. We run our net-
works at a coalition releaseability level that’s basically unclassified.42
It is ultimately these information security policies that prevent allies and
partners from operating at the same speed as the American military. Many of the
problems of interoperability between allies and coalition partners are the same
as those encountered in joint interoperability. Some have suggested that lessons
learned from the latter can be applied to coalitions.43 Nevertheless, the interven-
ing variable, not present in joint situations, is that of international politics. The
transnational element—particularly as it affects information security—makes
coalition and alliance interoperability an order more difficult than joint
interoperability.
It would be a gross overstatement to claim that the United States is uncon-
cerned by the issue of information releasability. Throughout the 1990s and still
today, the United States has sponsored Joint Warrior Interoperability Demon-
strations (JWIDs), intended to seek technical solutions to common and pressing
interoperability problems. These demonstrations have identified several techni-
cal solutions; for instance, “Radiant Mercury” and “SIREN” (Secure Informa-
tion Release Environment) decision-support software, which speed up the
sanitization and declassification of secret documents.44 The 1996 JWID identi-
fied the “Coalition Wide Area Network” (CWAN) as a “golden nugget.” CWAN
permits establishment of a common operational picture at a “coalition secret”
level. Separated (though not entirely) from the SIPRNET by software firewalls
and gateways, CWAN was initially introduced in the multinational RIMPAC
(“rim of the Pacific”) exercise series and is currently being widely used elsewhere
as well.45 Finally, the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for command and control
has sponsored a series of workshops and seminars among a working group com-
posed of Australia, Canada, Germany, Britain, and the United States, with
France as an observer. The working group seeks to identify the core needs of in-
formation exchange and to establish common doctrine and procedures prior to
any operation.46
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Dwight D. Eisenhower famously remarked, “Allied Commands depend on
mutual confidence.”47 Like relinquishing command and control, releasing sensi-
tive information is an act of trust between states surpassed only, perhaps, by
placing troops under even the limited control of an ally; releasing closely held
knowledge places technology, operations, and even personnel at risk.48 “Trust
involves a willingness to be vulnerable and to assume risk. Trust involves some
form of dependency.”49
Thus, we can expect that just as nations have always been unwilling to place
complete control of their troops under the control of foreign nations, they will
be unwilling to share completely all information they have: “As close as . . . Cana-
dian and British allies are in common interests and objectives, there will always
be limits to sharing the most highly classified information with these nations.”50
In the past, this reluctance did not typically jeopardize operations. However, in
network-centric warfare information is the cornerstone of all action; the exis-
tence of separate networks operating at different speeds will have an undeniable
impact on battle rhythms.
The United States is certainly willing to share most of its information with
certain partners. For forces of nations not in this privileged club, integration
into American networks will be increasingly difficult, depending on how often
they operate with the U.S. forces and the degree of trust extended to them.
Forces not permitted to take part in planning will ultimately be restricted sim-
ply to taking orders—possibly to assume high-casualty or politically distaste-
ful roles.51 The added risk is that multinational operations will become more
and more circumscribed, that allied participation will be accepted only under
the most restrictive circumstances. The United States is unlikely to hamstring
its own military forces or to slow its implementation of network-centric warfare
given its obvious benefits. It may decide simply to “pass” entirely on alliance
participation.52 Information releasability policy would ultimately decide,
then, not only the shape and nature of naval coalitions but possibly even their
very existence.
CANADIAN SHIPS IN AMERICAN CVBGS
One can get a sense of the challenges facing coalition naval network-centric war-
fare by examining the integration of Canadian warships into U.S. aircraft carrier
battle groups. In some respects, this case represents the crucible, for any difficul-
ties faced by Canadians are likely to be considerably more intense for navies out-
side the bonds of trust that have traditionally connected the Canadian and
American navies.
The Canadian navy began arranging to insert its ships into carrier battle
groups in the late 1990s in an effort to improve interoperability with the U.S.
M I T C H E L L 9 1
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Navy (see figure 2). Initially, only West Coast ships, operating out of Canadian
Forces Base Esquimalt, in British Columbia, were involved. The West Coast fleet
had fewer recurring operational commitments (such as the NATO Standing Naval
Force Atlantic) than the East Coast command in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Further,
the West Coast fleet had a long tradition of operating with the U.S. Navy and
were therefore more doctrinally compatible with it than the Halifax squadrons,
which had been primarily influenced by their long history of NATO operations.
Since their introduction, the integration of Canadian ships into CVBGs has
been an evolutionary process. Canadian ships began as members of the Mari-
time Interdiction Force in the Persian Gulf, later gradually moving into actual
battle groups as mutual familiarity improved. What started first as an opera-
tional initiative eventually gained an explicit strategic stature (in the Canadian
context), when it became Department of National Defence policy to improve
interoperability with its allies, particularly the United States. The department
now seeks to develop and maintain “tactically self-sufficient units,” capable of
substantial military contributions while asserting their Canadian identity. (A
ground-forces equivalent would be the role Canadian Coyote LAV IIIs, armored
reconnaissance vehicles, played in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan.) Com-
modore Dan McNeil, Director for Force Planning and Programme Co-ordination,
has recently remarked, “We will never be able to field strategic level forces. . . .
We’re not ever going to be in that game. We’re going to be fielding tactical units.
[However,] if you properly use tactical units, you can achieve strategic effect.
That is what we are trying to do.”53
A revolutionary aspect of these carrier battlegroup operations has been the
fact that individual Canadian ships have often replaced American ones. This
9 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
MARPAC Ships
1995, HMCS Calgary 50 days as independent ship in MIF
1997, HMCS Regina Surface action group
1998, HMCS Ottawa Abraham Lincoln BG, fully integrated
1999, HMCS Regina Constellation BG, replaced U.S. ship
2000, HMCS Calgary Surface action group, PacMEF
2001, HMCS Winnipeg Constellation BG, on-scene commander 17–24 July
02, TACON of all BG units
2001, HMCS Vancouver John C. Stennis BG
MARLANT Ships
2001, HMCS Charlottetown LANTMEF, joined Harry S. Truman BG in Med.
MIF Maritime Interdiction Force
BG battle group
PacMEF Pacific Marine Expeditionary Force
TACON tactical control
LANTMEF Atlantic Marine Expeditionary Force
FIGURE 2
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arrangement has been of mutual benefit; the United States has been able to ad-
dress its shortages of frigates and destroyers, and Canada has been afforded pro-
fessional opportunities that it could not hope to obtain on its own. These
opportunities include not only extended operations in groups larger than those
the Canadian navy typically sends to sea but also exposure to assets not in the
Canadian order of battle—carriers, cruisers, and nuclear submarines.
Canada has thus become a member of a select club, enjoying special access to
the command and control concepts developed by the U.S. Navy as it travels
down the road of network-centric warfare, as well as to military support not
normally offered to allies. Finally, CVBG operations enable the Canadian navy
to develop professional skills in the areas of littoral and interdiction operations,
for which there is no opportunity in North American waters.
At the same time, such deployments stress the mutual dependencies and vul-
nerabilities that are central to every good coalition operation. For the Canadian
navy, given the relative scarcity of Canadian ships (Canada has only twelve Halifax-
class frigates), each unit deployed has value out of proportion to its ultimate
contribution to a carrier battle group. Obviously, sending such ships into the
Persian and Arabian Gulfs, as is typical, is far more dangerous than assigning
them to the standard fisheries patrols in Canadian waters they would most likely
be conducting otherwise. Similarly, by replacing an American ship with a Cana-
dian one, rather than simply augmenting the group, the U.S. Navy is placing
considerable trust in the professionalism and competence of Canadian crews; as
one battle group commander has declared, “We need to be ready to go on game
day—and when we play, every game is game day.”54 Accepting a Canadian ship
into a battle group also constitutes a commitment to look after that ship.
To ensure that they are not liabilities for their new battle groups, Canadian
ships participate in the same exercises and workups that all American ships do.
Similarly, they carry the latest revisions of the Global Command and Control
System–Maritime (GCCS-M) and conduct training to ensure that they can
share and use the information and imagery distributed on that system. The Ca-
nadian navy has been increasingly challenged by such upgrades, however, due to
the legacy systems on board its ships. The CCS330 system that controls the ship
displays in the operations rooms of the Halifax frigates and Iroquois-class de-
stroyers is a closed-architecture system based on a unique operating system and
military-specific software and hardware. State of the art ten years ago, it is be-
coming increasingly a maintenance problem and, even more seriously, has a very
limited capacity for integration with new systems. New capabilities, like
GCCS-M, must be added to Canadian ships on a stand-alone basis. Canadian
display terminals, as a result, cannot send or receive operational messages; tacti-
cal networking requires separate consoles; and the information provided by
M I T C H E L L 9 3
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systems like GCCS-M and the Canadian equivalent of the SIPRNET, known as
MCOIN III, become effectively “stovepiped.” The result is a cluttered operations
room where decision makers must consult a number of systems in order to
gather all the information necessary to perform their jobs—obviously not the
most efficient arrangement in the heat of battle.55
Interestingly, the Canadian navy’s effort to remain abreast of the fast-moving
electronics revolution in command and control technologies is not being driven
by American requirements. The United States is pleased that Canada strives to
prevent gaps in capabilities. However, Canadian naval officers stress, it is the
long history of naval cooperation
and overall familiarity between
the navies that has facilitated
these exchanges, not the technical
“kit” installed aboard Canadian
ships.56 The difficulties Canadian ships typically encounter in integrating them-
selves into American battle groups largely arise from the issue of accessibility.
In battlegroup operations, as noted, the Coalition Wide Area Network is the
principal means for coordinating action between Canadian and American ships;
the U.S. Navy is gradually migrating its command, control, communications,
planning, and execution functions to web and other digitally based delivery
methods, notably the SIPRNET. However, CWAN and SIPRNET have mutual
interface limitations. E-mail can pass between the two systems as long as the U.S.
user has a CWAN account. Nevertheless, a security “firewall” strips off attach-
ments before admitting messages into the CWAN. Thus a Canadian recipient
may receive a commander’s directive but not the supporting and amplifying in-
formation that originally accompanied it. Furthermore, messages from
SIPRNET users without registered CWAN accounts will not reach Canadian
ships, which may thereby miss important items.
The growing use of “chat” features to plan and coordinate has also been
noted, and CWAN has such features. However, there is no interconnection be-
tween SIPRNET chat and CWAN chat. In order for a Canadian ship to partici-
pate in a session with American counterparts, a CWAN liaison officer must type
into CWAN what was entered onto the SIPRNET system. Any attachment must
be “air-gapped” onto CWAN, which can be quite a complicated procedure, in-
volving multiple transfers between networks (SIPRNET to NATO Information
Tactical Display System to MCOIN III).57 As there is frequently only a single Ca-
nadian liaison officer on the carrier, accordingly, transfers between the two sys-
tems are likely to be delayed when that officer is not on watch.58 Canada urges
the U.S. flagships to man the CWAN terminal during these times, but it is likely
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to be overlooked in periods of high operational tempo—just when the Canadian
ships most need the information.
Finally, the web features of SIPRNET are limited on the CWAN side. CWAN
supports web pages, but they contain only information placed there by coalition
partners. In a U.S.-run operation, the majority of the information needed will
be originating from the United States. There is no direct connection between
SIPRNET web pages and CWAN web pages; web files must be “air-gapped.” As a
result, CWAN and MCOIN III are often out of date, sometimes by days. Further-
more, CWAN information is likely to be only a “snapshot” of that available to
SIPRNET, without the functional links that it has on the U.S. side, limiting the
ability of coalition officers to “surf ” for more information. Finally, the carrier is
usually the only U.S. ship in a battle group with a CWAN terminal, in which case
it is the sole unit capable of posting information there—making it all the more
possible that important information will not be posted at all.
TRUST AND UNILATERALISM
There may be nothing available but inefficient, work-around solutions to these
problems. The real difficulty is not so much technical as policy oriented. The
natural desire to protect sensitive information is at the root of all these issues,
and it is not unique to the United States—MCOIN III is a Canada-only system,
just as SIPRNET is U.S.-only. We should not expect this sensitivity to disappear
any time soon; in fact, 11 September 2001 doubtless heightened it. Releasability
software helps to move information onto coalition networks in a timely fashion,
but they are not gateways to the information that American officers use on a
day-to-day basis. This results in two quandaries for Canadian ships. First, they
often operate without even basic operational-procedure manuals; some publi-
cations have not been classified as releasable to Canada or to the Coalition Wide
Area Network. Without such formal guidance, U.S. officers are generally reluc-
tant to release even what is seemingly innocuous data for fear of making mis-
takes that could have repercussions for their careers.59 Second, since the makeup
of a carrier battle group is not permanent, information-sharing protocols must
be rebrokered for each deployment. Sometimes gaining access is a question of
proving one’s bona fides to the battle group; sometimes the battlegroup staff is
simply unaware what information has been passed, or is otherwise available, to
the Canadian ship. Often such problems are resolved when the battlegroup com-
mander becomes aware of them, but the necessity to approach “the flag” for such
matters highlights the impediments to network operations in a coalition
environment.
The Canadian experience with U.S. carrier battle groups is instructive in both
positive and negative senses for the overall question of network-centric
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operations in a coalition environment. It is positive in demonstrating that de-
spite technical limitations and differences between two navies, effective cooper-
ation can be achieved in the modern naval environment. Once willingness to
cooperate and a basis of trust between two forces has been established, technol-
ogy is not an impassable barrier. Canada’s close experience with the United
States may be helpful to other navies. In its vision document Leadmark, the Ca-
nadian navy has proposed to develop a “Gateway C4ISR”* function that would
allow less capable navies to integrate themselves into network-centric opera-
tions.60 The Canadian navy has performed such a function in the past. During
the Gulf War, among the deciding factors in the selection of Canada to lead the
Combat Logistics Force were its excellent interoperability with the United States
(a proposed French ship, Doudart de Lagrée, “lacked good communications
interoperability”), its multinational crews, and its remaining legacy communica-
tions systems (with which Canadian ships could talk with more or less all warships
present).61 At present, Canadian ships play an important intermediary role in
passing on information to other coalition partners in the Arabian Gulf.
However, there is a very large caveat—the relationship between the Canadian
navy and the U.S. Navy took decades to evolve, and even so significant impedi-
ments remain to the seamless integration of forces that network-centric warfare
demands. Further, while CVBGs must be prepared for all warfare eventualities,
Canadian ships have participated predominantly in maritime interdiction. One
wonders how welcome even Canadian ships might be in an operation domi-
nated by strike warfare, against an asymmetric surface threat, in the littoral.
Finally, the security demands of U.S. military networks are likely to be trouble-
some indeed for navies without the privileged access afforded to Canadian ships
and crews on the basis of long-shared operational experience and a wealth of
trust. Indeed, if the Canadian experience indicates that coalition network-
centric operations are possible, it also indicates that the price of admission will
remain very high. In a dynamic coalition environment, professional trust will be
critical, and the height of the bar will be set by both technology and policy. Be-
cause of the crippling effect of slower networks or nonnetworked ships in such a
setting, information releasability issues may be a stimulus to American
unilateralism.
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